University of Miami Law Review
Volume 21

Number 1

Article 9

10-1-1966

Zoning
Elliott Harris

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr

Recommended Citation
Elliott Harris, Zoning, 21 U. Miami L. Rev. 195 (1966)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol21/iss1/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
library@law.miami.edu.

ZONING
ELLIOTT HARRIS*
INTRODUCTION

I.
II.

...........................................................

195

196
197
197
202
202

POW ER SOURCE ..........................................................
PROCEDURAL ISSUES ......................................................

1. Presumptions and Burdens: The Fairly Debatable Rule ..................
2. N otice ...............................................................
3. Hearing .............................................................
a.

ADMINISTRATIVE

b.

ADMINISTRATIVE QUASI-JUDICIAL HEARING

LEGISLATIVE

HEARING

203

..............................

203
204
205
206
209
209

............................

4. Standing .............................................................
5. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies .................................
6. Judicial R eview ......................................................
III.

IV.
V.

VI.
VII.
VIII.

ZONING FOR AESTHETICS ..................................................
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL ....................................................
CHANGE IN CONDITIONS ..................................................
RETROACTIVE ZONING, NONCONFORMING USES, VARIANCES ....................
REGULATION OF A GOVERNMENTAL PROPRIETARY FUNCTION BY ZONING
CONCLUSION

............................................................

210
211
.........

213

214

INTRODUCTION

Zoning is perhaps the most important area of law affecting property
values. Nothing pleases a property owner more than to have his property
value increased by re-zoning; nothing upsets a client more than to have
the value of his property decreased by re-zoning. Spurred on by Florida's
rapid growth, property owners are constantly subjecting local units of
government to pressure as they seek changes which would be beneficial
to them. As a consequence of these realities, Florida's courts have been
confronted with an abundance of suits brought in pursuance of attempts
to increase property values by obtaining relief from zoning ordinances
and suits brought to prevent a diminution in property values by blocking allegedly unfair zoning changes.
The procedures used in zoning cases by these litigants, the presumption of validity attaching to zoning ordinances, and the issues relating to
substantive due process1 arising out of the exercise of the police power to
zone were among the major issues involved in Florida zoning cases
during the past years.2 The law regarding these concerns is the subject
matter of this article.
* Member of the Florida bar; former Assistant Editor, University of Miami Law
Review.
1. Substantive due process determines the governmental power to take or regulate life,
liberty or property. This is distinguished from procedural due process. The former involves
the validity of the exercise of governmental power; the latter is related to the procedures
necessary to allow the governmental body to "take" or "regulate." Semet, Florida Constitutional Law, 18 U. MIAMI L. REV. 888, 897 (1964).
2. This survey encompasses the period October, 1963 to January, 1966, or more specifically, 160 So.2d 1 through 181 So.2d 160.
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POWER SOURCE

As indicated by its consistent refusal to accept any zoning case for
review since 1949,1 the United States Supreme Court considers the constitutionality of zoning ordinances settled insofar as the federal constitution is concerned.' The decision of the Court in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.' virtually settled all constitutional questions relating
to zoning enabling acts.
The power of the state to legislate in regard to the health, safety,
morals and general welfare of the people, generally described by the

term "police power," serves as the constitutional power source for every
municipal and county zoning ordinance in Florida.' Counties are political
subdivisions of the state,7 and therefore have an inherent police power.
However, the power of municipal authorities to exercise zoning regulations is neither inherent, absolute, nor unlimited. Municipal power is
derived from a delegation of the state's legislative power which is generally vested in the municipalities through a general municipal zoning
law.'
The municipalities can, therefore, exercise only such powers as are
granted to them by the state, and must exercise them in the manner
prescribed by the state. If their exercise of police power goes beyond
that which is necessary to obtain protection for the public, then it is
unreasonable and unconstitutional under Florida's due process clause.' °
3. 1 RATHKOPF, ZONING & PLANNING 4-1 (3d ed. 1959) cited State ex rel. Saveland Park
Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wisc. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841
(1955) as indicating the United States Supreme Court's reluctance to review zoning cases.
The author contended that the court's refusal to review the constitutionality of the unusual ordinance in that case indicated that the federal constitutional problems with zoning
ordinances have been settled. In Wieland, the Wisconsin court held that a village zoning
ordinance constituted a valid exercise of police power although the ordinance gave wide
discretion to the village building board. The regulation required that exterior architectural
appeal of proposed buildings must satisfy the board that the buildings would conform to
existing structures so that those existing structures would not depredate in value because of
the new buildings.
4. 1 RATHKOPF, op. cit. supra note 4.
5. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
6. 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 38.03 (1964); 1 RATHKOPF, ZONING
& PLANNING 2-1 (3d ed. 1959); Wright, Zoning Under the Florida Law, 7 MIAMI L.Q. 324,
325 (1953).
7. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
8. Fla. Laws 1939, ch. 19539, at 1248; FLA. STAT. ch. 176 (1965). The legislature validly
delegated this power to the municipalities. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 8 provides: "The Legislature shall have power to establish, and to abolish, municipalities to provide for their government, to prescribe their jurisdiction and powers, and to alter or amend the same at any
time." Prior to the adoption of this general zoning statute, Florida municipalities obtained
power to zone through special legislative acts or proceeded to restrict the use of land under
the theory of nuisance. See generally Wright, Zoning Under the Florida Law, 7 MIAMI L.Q.
324, 325-334 (1953).
9. Ellis v. City of Winter Haven, 60 So.2d 620 (Fla. 1952); State ex rel. Helseth v.
Du Bose, 99 Fla. 812, 128 So. 4 (1930).
10. City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So.2d 148 (Fla. 1953); Forde v. City of Miami
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This necessity is determined by an inquiry as to whether there exists
the necessary direct relationship between the regulation and the result
it seeks to accomplish."
A zoning ordinance may be valid and constitutional as generally
applied, but invalid as applied to particular property. For example, the
zoning ordinance in Reynolds v. Town of Manalapan2 prohibited the
erection of a structure other than a house in a residence district; the
ordinance specified that only houses, with no outbuildings to be used as
dwellings, could be erected on the lots that extended the width of the
zoned island, from the ocean to a lake. The property in question was
subsequently divided by a highway, separating a residence on one side
from a beach house on the other; the beach house was rented as a complete living unit. It was held that the ordinance was generally valid, but
was arbitrary as applied to the lot in question. The highway was a barrier
rendering the property on one side incapable of use as a "unit" which included the property on the other side.
II.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

1. Presumptions and Burdens: The Fairly Debatable Rule
Prior to 1939, the burden was on the municipality to prove its power
to restrict the use of land by zoning ordinances. The basic tenet was
that ordinances in derogation of common law should be strictly construed
in favor of the individual. After the Florida Municipal Zoning Law was
adopted, there was no need to apply this doctrine to cases contesting such
legislation regarding land use because there was now an express delegation of power. Typically the benefit of a presumption was initially sought
by the landowner when he contested the validity of an ordinance. Although the presumption is rebuttable, in recent years it has shifted so
as to favor the legislative body; thus the person attacking the ordinance
Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 1 So.2d 642 (1941); Dade County v. Pepper, 168 So.2d 198 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1964).
FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 12 states that "No person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken without
just compensation"
Florida's equal protection clause, FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 1, is a safeguard
against discriminatory abusive use of the police power.
11. The purpose of zoning is to provide a comprehensive plan to lessen the congestion on the highways; to secure safety from fire; to promote health, safety,
morals, convenience and the general welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to
prevent the over-crowding of land and water; to avoid undue concentration of
population; to facilitate the adequate provisions of transportation, water, sewage,
schools, parks and other public requirements, with the view of giving reasonable
consideration, among other things, to the character of the district or area and its
peculiar suitability for particular uses and with a view to conserving the value of
buildings and property and encouraging' the most appropriate use of land and
water.
FLA. STAT. § 176.04 (1965); DADE CouNTY, FLA., METROPOLITAN CODE § 33-311 (1959);
35 FA. JUR. Zoning Laws § 2 (1961).
12. 167 So.2d 607 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
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now has the onus of proving its invalidity. This presumption sustains
the legislative intent even when the validity of the ordinance is fairly
debatable.13
The second district, however, recently interpreted the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Burritt v. Harris14 to mean that this presumption is to favor the party contesting the validity of a zoning authority;
i.e., that the fairly debatable doctrine has been overruled. 5
Burritt purchased the property in question in 1957 with full knowledge that, although adjoining the Jacksonville Imeson Airport, it was
zoned "Residence A."'" Subsequently, Burritt tried several times to have
the various county administrative bodies rezone his property to "Industrial A,"'" the more restrictive of two industrial zoning classifications.
After exhausting his administrative remedies without success, Burritt
brought an original suit in equity 8 to review the decision of the county
zoning board and have the court declare the "Residence A" classification
void as unreasonable and arbitrary. Burritt contended that he was being
deprived of his property without due process of law because of the
confiscatory effect of the ordinance.
The landowner submitted evidence to show that the property was
unfit for residential uses. The airport noises, obnoxious odors and smoke
from nearby industries meant that the property would not qualify for
Veterans Administration or Federal Housing Administration loans, and
further, he showed that similar property in the area had been rezoned
"Industrial."
13. 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 38.08 (1964); Wright, Zoning Under
the Florida Law, 7 MIAMI L.Q. 324, 334-341 (1953).
14. 172 So.2d 820 (1965).
15. By this holding [Burritt v. Harris) the Supreme Court has created an innovation in the zoning law of Florida by casting on the zoning authority the burden of
establishing by a preponderance of evidence that the zoning restrictions under
attack "bear substantially on the public health, morals, safety or welfare of the
community" if the ordinance is to be sustained. Lawley v. Town of Golfview, 174
So.2d 767, 770 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
16. Property zoned as "Residence A" has its use thereby restricted exclusively to
residences, publicly owned and operated recreational facilities, churches and schools,
and non-commercial boat piers or slips for docking private watercraft, and accessory buildings.
Burritt v. Harris, 166 So.2d 168, 170 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
As the landowner was challenging the validity of the ordinance, it was immaterial that
the land was already so zoned when he acquired the property. 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS § 38.10(4) (1964).
17. Property zoned "Industrial A" by the zoning regulations may be used for light
to medium manufacturing and industry, including sawmills and machine shops, for
certain commercial uses, and for retail establishments.
Burritt v. Harris, supra note 6, at 171.
18. The county originally made a motion to dismiss the complaint from the circuit court
on the ground that an original suit did not lie in equity to review a decision of a county
zoning board, and that such decision could only be review by certiorari. The chancellor
denied this motion and was upheld by the second district when the county took an
interlocutory appeal from the denial of the motion. Harris v. Burritt, 151 So.2d 645 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1963). See section on Judicial Review, infra, especially note 72 and the discussion
of Harris v. Goff, 151 So.2d 642 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
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However, the county established that even without rezoning the
property had increased in value; the Federal Aviation Administration
was already concerned about the emission of smoke in the area (a safety
factor); and the roads leading to the property were not of a sufficient
quality to be used in an industrial area.
The circuit court dismissed the complaint. The second district affirmed 9 on the theory that it was not conclusively shown ° that the regulations of the zoning boards deprived the appellant of his property without due process, nor did the regulations unreasonably infringe on other
state or federal constitutional guarantees. 2' The decision apparently
means that when the action of the zoning board is not proved to be either
arbitrary or unreasonable, but its validity is fairly debatable, the legislative judgment will be sustained.
Justice Rawls dissented,22 contending that the appellant had sustained the burden placed upon him by proving that his property was unsuitable for the restrictive use applied to it. The burden of presenting a
debatable issue, that is the "burden of going forward" 28 as to the reasonableness of the strict classification, then fell upon the county board.2 4
Rawls' dissent stated that no debatable issue was presented by the county
because the uncontradicted testimony was to the effect that the property
was unsuitable for residences and therefore Burritt was being deprived of
the beneficial use of his property. To the dissent, it was fundamental that
there be a right to devote one's real property to a legitimate use and
that this right should not be curtailed by unreasonable restrictions under
the guise of police power.
Justice Rawls' dissenting opinion appears to have been adopted by
the Florida Supreme Court. On certiorari, the Board of County Commissioners tried to sustain the district court's decision by putting emphasis
on the "safety" factor. The supreme court held that the Board's continued zoning classification of Burritt's property was not motivated by
a fear of increased hazard around the airport; therefore, it had not been
demonstrated that the classification had any relation to health, morals,
19. Burritt v. Harris, 166 So.2d 168 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
20. Emphasis supplied.
21. If the restrictions on private property are not kept within the limits of necessity
for the public welfare, it is considered an unlawful taking. Averne Bay Constr. Co. v.
Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938). FiA. CoNsT. DE L. OF RIGHTS § 12 (just
compensation clause); FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTs § 1 (equal protection); U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1 (equal protection).
22. Burritt v. Harris, supra note 19, at 175.
23. 2 BOYER, op. cit. supra note 6, § 38.08(1) contends that this burden is not simply
one of going forward with the evidence, but is a burden of proof.
24. In a zoning case, the burden of going forward with the pleading and presentation of evidence rests on the person contesting the validity of a zoning ordinance,
but thereafter the burden of proof of the reasonableness of the means employed
and the reasonableness of the effect on the plaintiff's property rights rests on the
[legislative body). Wright, op. cit. supra note 8, at 341. (Emphasis added.)
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safety or the general welfare. To the court, the Board had failed to
demonstrate that the question was debatable.
One of the reasons, of course, for the existence of the fairly debatable
rule is the principle that courts generally should not substitute their
judgment for that of the local legislative body. This means that courts
will not indulge in rezoning.25 As the second district put it:
To better understand the reluctance on the part of a court to
re-zone, and the theory behind the principle, it must be borne in
mind that zoning regulations . . . are concerned with innumera-

ble, detailed items normally involving definitions, general provisions, exceptions, special requirements, districting, administration, and provisions for a Board of Adjustment. In each of the
various districts, numerous uses are permitted and innumerable
uses are prohibited. Thus, it may be seen that where ...

a court

has determined that a denial to a party of a specific use of its
property is unreasonable and arbitrary and that the zoning is
therefore void as to the property of that party, and the court
directs that the zoning authorities may re-zone said property
within a specified time, then such re-zoning is subject to the
usual judgment and discretion of the zoning authorities in adopting the many details of zoning regulations ...

26

This, of course, conflicts somewhat with the traditional view that:
[T]he doctrine of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed
60, [is] applicable. 'When it is clear that a statute transgresses
the authority vested in the legislature by the constitution, it is
the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because
they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths to office.
This duty of the courts to maintain the constitution as the
fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing' and
applies as imperatively when properly invoked against a zoning
ordinance as it does against an act of the legislature.... 2 7
The judiciary of this state has traditionally protected an individual's rights from the arbitrary edicts of the other arms of
government, and once it ceases to fulfill this role, we then may
contemplate
the full impact of the heel of autocratic bureau28
cracy.
In Watson v. Mayflower Property, Inc.,29 intervening property
owners on the west shore of a two-hundred-foot-wide lake offered opinions
25. Sarasota County v. Walker, 144 So.2d 345 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962); Village of Pembroke Pines v. Zitreen, 143 So.2d 660 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962); Schoenith v. City of South
Miami, 121 So.2d 810 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960).

26. Hillsborough County v. Twin Lakes Mobile Home Village, 166 So.2d 191, 194
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
27. City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So.2d 148, 150 (Fla. 1953).
28. Burritt v. Harris, supra note 19, at 182 (dissenting opinion).
29. 177 So.2d 355 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
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that their land value would decrease if the subject property was rezoned
to permit hotels and apartment houses because: (1) breezes, sunshine and
a view of the sunrise over the ocean would be lost; (2) traffic on the
west side of the lake would increase, causing noise, congestion and dirt.
Unfortunately it was not factually shown that these losses would be
sustained and counter-opinions were offered to the effect that any increase
in traffic would not be "through" traffic, therefore that there would be
no effect on the property values of the intervenors. The city argued that
the lower court erroneously held the fairly debatable rule inapplicable,
as reasonable men could differ in their conclusions, the evidence did not
conclusively demonstrate that private property interests were being confiscated for the benefit of adjoining landowners. These arguments made
it necessary for the court to review the facts as found by the Chancellor
to see if the fairly debatable rule applied.
To be valid, a zoning ordinance must have a substantial relationship
to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Florida courts
will hold a zoning ordinance invalid when it clearly appears that the restrictions are arbitrary and unreasonable. An ordinance may be fairly
debatable when it is open to dispute on grounds that make sense to
Florida courts. If the validity of the ordinance is fairly debatable, the
court should not substitute its judgment for that of the enacting governmental agency. 30
The holding in Mayflower seems unassailable when based on the
conclusion that the ordinance was not even fairly debatable. However,
because of the earlier decision in Lawley v. Town of Golfview, 8 ' and because of the great weight apparently placed on the fact that the property
in question would be of much greater value with a less restricted classification, two questions are raised:
(1) Did the second district recede from its position in Lawley
where the court contended that the Florida Supreme Court decision in
Burritt v. Harris abrogated the fairly debatable rule in Florida and that
the onus of establishing the constitutional validity of an ordinance was
now on the legislative body promulgating the regulation? If not, why
did the second district in Mayflower treat as an issue whether or not
the landowner had established that the ordinance was not fairly debatable,
as the city offered no evidence? 8"
(2) Was the holding in fact based upon purely economic considerations? It has been held that under Florida substantive due process,
economic impact (financial property loss) by itself will not bar a valid
30.
Walker,
31.
32.

City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So.2d 148 (Fla. 1953); Sarasota County v.
144 So.2d 345 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962). 35 FLA. JuR. Zoning Laws § 10 (1961).
174 So.2d 767 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965). See text accompanying note 15 supra.
Watson v. Mayflower Property, Inc., 177 So.2d 355, 361 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
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exercise of police power. 3 Obviously the court in Mayflower concluded
that the burdensome restriction was on the border of being confiscatory
because of the variation in price that a more liberal classification would
34

bring.

2. Notice
A city can be authorized to enact zoning ordinances in the exercise
of the police power of the state, but in promulgating such regulations,
there must be strict adherence to procedural due process of law-adequate notice and a public hearing held before the adoption of such regulations. 5
What is adequate notice? It must apprise the public of the suggested
changes and the zoning amendment as ultimately adopted must conform
substantially to the changes as publicized in the notice. 6 A deviation
may be immaterial where the variance is a liberalization of zoning, rather
than an enlarged restraint on the property involved. Upgrading a zoning
regulation from that which is requested is not a deviation from the hearing for which notice was given. In McGee v. City of Cocoa37 there was
found sufficient notice of a requested zoning change for seven lots from
residential to wholesale commercial. At the hearing the city granted the
request for five lots, but limited the remaining lots to uses more restrictive
than wholesale commercial. A party contesting the validity of the change
had no cause to argue "lack of notice" as to the two lots. The party was
not prejudiced by the failure of the city to zone at a more liberal classification. Conversely, if the zoning change had been more liberal than that
which was requested, a party could have contested the validity of the
resolution because of "lack of notice."
3. Hearing
The hearings held by the zoning authorities fall into two categories. 38
The first, a hearing held prior to the adoption of a zoning ordinance or
33. State v. Farrey, 133 Fla. 15, 182 So. 448 (1938) ; Town of Surfside v. Abelson, 106
So.2d 108 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958), cert. denied, Ill So.2d 40 (Fla. 1950). Cf., Abdo v. City of
Daytona Beach, 147 So.2d 598 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
34. See generally 2 BOYER, op. cit. supra note 6, § 38.09(3) (b).
35. City of Hollywood v. Petterseii, 178 So.2d 919 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
36. FLA. STAT. § 176.05 (1965).
No such regulation, restriction, or boundary shall become effective until after a
public hearing in relation thereto, at which parties in interest and citizens shall have
an opportunity to be heard. At least fifteen days notice of the time and place of
such hearing shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in said munic-

ipality and if there be no newspaper published within the municipality then three
notices shall be published in at least three conspicuous places within the municipality
including the city or town hall as the case may be.
37. 168 So.2d 766 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
38. See generally 1 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.05 (1958); 8 McQuLIN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.251 (3d ed. rev. 1957); 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW & PRACTICE
§ 127 (2d ed. 1953).
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amendment, is classified as an administrative legislative hearing. The
second, when the action of the zoning body is particular and immediate,
rather than general and prospective in regard to property, is called an
administrative quasi-judicial hearing. For example, a hearing regarding
the issuance of a variance permit would be in this second class as it
affects only the applicant and his neighbors or competitors.
a.

ADMINISTRATIVE LEGISLATIVE HEARING

The Municipal Zoning Laws have been construed to require89 the
local governing body to provide a full, public hearing before enacting a
zoning regulation.4" These provisions of notice and hearing cannot be
disregarded or relaxed even when regarded as an emergency measure.4
In City of Miami Beach v. State,42 after the hotel's application for
a building permit had been rejected because of an objectionable stairway,
the city passed an emergency "set back" ordinance. If valid, the ordinance would have made it impossible for the hotel to build its proposed
fourteen-story addition. When the hotel's original building plans were
amended to rectify the stairway defect, the city again rejected the application on the ground that the plans did not comply with the "set back"
ordinance. The hotel brought mandamus proceedings against the city to
compel the issuance of a building permit. It was held that the emergency
ordinance was invalid in that the city did not comply with the notice and
hearing requirements of the applicable statute.
b.

ADMINISTRATIVE

QUASI-JUDICIAL

HEARINGS

Quasi-judicial hearings of local governing bodies are more like trials
than the legislative hearings in that the procedure is more formal and
questions of fact are decided.4 3 Because the decisions of the administrative body acting in this capacity affect the property rights of particular
individuals, strict compliance with notice and hearing requirements is
necessary to satisfy the constitutional safeguard of procedural due
process.44
Drogaris v. Martine's, Inc.,4 5 described an administrative quasijudicial hearing:
39. 2 BOYER, op. cit. supra note 6, § 38.06(1)(4).
40. FLA. STAT. § 176.05 (1965), construed by Town of Hillsboro Beach v. Weaver,
77 So.2d 463 (Fla. 1955) and City of Hollywood v. Rix, 52 So.2d 135 (Fla. 1951).
41. City of Miami Beach v. State ex rel. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 108 So.2d 614
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1959), cert. denied, 111 So.2d 437 (Fla. 1959).
42. Ibid.
43. McRae v. Robbins, 151 Fla. 109, 9 So.2d 284 (1942).
44. Alloway & Knight, Trends in Florida Constitutional Law, 16 U. Mkm. L. REV. 685,
724-728 (1962); Foss, Interested Third Parties in Zoning, 12 U. FLA. L. REV. 16, 43 (1959).
45. 118 So.2d 95, 96 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960) (Florida Industrial Commission had denied the
litigant the right to compulsory attendance of a witness in an unemployment compensation
controversy.), quoting from 42 AM. Jun. Public Administrative Law § 137 (1942).
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An administrative hearing in the exercise of judicial or
quasi-judicial powers must be fair, open, and impartial. The
right to such a hearing is an inexorable safeguard and one of
the rudiments of fair play assured to every litigant by the
Fourteenth Amendment as a minimal requirement. There can be
no compromise on the footing of convenience or expediency, or
because of a natural desire to be rid of harassing delay, when
that minimal requirement has been neglected or ignored. The
breadth of administrative discretion places in a strong light
the necessity for maintaining in its integrity the essentials of
a fair and open hearing. When such a hearing has been denied,
the administrative action is void.
These due process requirements also allow the litigant to be represented by counsel, to present evidence in support of his position, and
to cross-examine adverse witnesses whose testimony is offered at the
46
hearing.
If the administrative board insists that its quasi-judicial rulings
made at the hearing be reviewed only by certiorari, the board is obliged
to see that a proper record of the proceeding is made, including findings
and conclusions based on the evidence.
4. Standing

A decision of a zoning board may be attacked by any person affected
by that decision.4" Any person who is in doubt as to his rights and status
under a municipal ordinance may obtain a declaration thereof.49 For
example a competitor of the party that desired a variance to allow a
liquor lounge within twenty-five hundred feet of another liquor licensee
had standing to contest the variance permit.50
The Florida Constitution granted Dade County its Home Rule
Charter, under which the Board of County Commissioners was empowered to adopt ordinances relating to the property located in the unincorporated areas of Dade County."' The Zoning Appeals Board was
created pursuant to the Home Rule Charter to utilize the county's zoning powers. 2 Its purpose was to provide a board to hear, consider and
review appeals from the zoning regulations or decisions of an administrative official. Any aggrieved person whose name appears of record may
46. Bloomfield v. Mayo, 119 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960).
47. Harris v. Goff, 151 So.2d 642 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
48. FLA. STAT. § 176.11 (1965).
49. See generally Foss, Interested Third Parties in Zoning, op. cit. supra note 44.
50. City of Miami v. Franklin Leslie, Inc., 179 So.2d 622 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
51. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 11(1) (b). DADE COUNTY, FLA., METROPOLITAN CODE § 33-303
(1959) made the procedures set out in that chapter exclusive in the unincorporated areas
of the county.
52. DADE COUNTY, FLA., HOME RULE CHARTER § 4.08 (1959).
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contest the action of the Zoning Appeals Board by petition to the Board
of County Commissioners."
In a 1965 decision, the owner of a bar was granted an exception by
the Zoning Appeals Board to enlarge his facility to a night club a
church located within twenty-five hundred feet of the property appealed
to the Board of County Commissioners and obtained a reversal. The bar
owner then brought suit for a declaratory decree in the circuit court to
determine if the church had standing to appeal the original ruling of the
Zoning Appeals Board. The church had not objected at the Zoning Appeals Board hearing. The chancellor held that the church was precluded
from appealing the Zoning Appeals Board's decision; therefore, the
later action by the Board of County Commissioners was void. On appeal,
the chancellor was reversed. The mere appearance of the church in an
exhibit that was required of the bar owner before the Zoning Appeals
Board gave the church sufficient standing to appear before the Board of
County Commissioners without having previously contested the Zoning
Appeals Board's action.54
5. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Generally, review procedures of administrative bodies must be exhausted before subsequent judicial appellate review is available.5 5
The Code of Metropolitan Dade County provides that a three-fourths
majority vote is necessary for the Zoning Appeals Board to approve an
application for a variance.56 In Hasam Realty Corp. v. Dade County,5 7
an application for a variance was not approved as it received a vote of
seven for approval and two against, with one abstention. As provided
by the code,' an appeal was taken to the Board of County Commissioners. Before the hearing on the appeal, the appellant filed suit in the
circuit court to determine the effect of the vote of the Zoning Appeals
Board. This complaint was dismissed with prejudice because there was
no cause of action when the complaint was filed. Appellant should have
exhausted his administrative remedies. The third district affirmed.
Furthermore, even when the Board of County Commissioners later
affirmed the Zoning Appeals Board's denial of the variance, the defect
53. DADE COUNTY, FLA., METROPOLITAN CODE § 33-313 (1959).
54. Dade County v. Jim's Northwest, Inc., 171 So.2d 612 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
55. A legislative body may waive the right to demand that a complainant exhaust his
administrative procedures for review by not raising this defense. If the validity of the
entire ordinance is attacked, as contrasted with the claim that an ordinance is invalid as
applied to a particular property, judicial relief is available by an original suit in equity
without exhausting the administrative processes. 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 38.13 (1964). See text accompanying notes 64 to 73, infra, regarding judicial
review.
56. DADE COUNTY, FLA., METROPOLITAN CODE § 33-308 (1959).
57. 178 So.2d 747 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
58. DADE COUNTY, FLA., METROPOLITAN CODE § 33-313 (1959).
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in the circuit court suit was not remedied by the accrual of a valid cause
of action after the complaint was filed.
When justified by a compelling public interest, it may not be a
denial of procedural due process for an administrative official to summarily revoke a business permit as long as there is a right of review
within the administrative framework subsequent to the order of revocation. 50 For example, a dump operator's conditional use and occupancy
permit was revoked by the county building and zoning director. He immediately petitioned the circuit court for an injunction, without appealing to the Board of County Commissioners. The summary decree in
favor of the zoning official was upheld on appeal. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to judicial relief."
It is, however, unnecessary to pursue administrative remedies when
it is shown that the effort would be fruitless. In Hillsborough County v.
Twin Lakes Mobile Home Village, Inc."' the landowner had availed himself of every administrative procedure before he obtained judicial relief
that his land was zoned too restrictively. The county made a slight zoning change to comply with the decree, but not a sufficient change to
enable the owner to obtain beneficial use of the land. The landowner's
"motion of summary post decretal order" was not overcome by the
county's demand that the administrative procedures be exhausted once
more. Forcing the landowner to go back through administrative procedures could result in endless litigation. When a court directs the zoning
authorities to rezone property, the rezoning is generally subject to the
discretion of the zoning authorities, "but the party has an adjudicated
for the purposes found by the court to
right to the use of its property
62
proper.
and
reasonable
be
6. Judicial Review
3

A trilogy of cases led the third district to explain the proper method
of obtaining judicial review from the various zoning authorities.
Judicial review as provided for under the municipal zoning statute
requires a petition to the circuit court to issue a writ of certiorari to test
59. Larson v. Warran, 132 So.2d 177 (Fla. 1961) (driver's license), noted, 16 U.
MiAmI L. REV. 477 (1962) ; Thornhill v. Kirkman, 62 So.2d 740 (Fla. 1953) (driver's license).
60. Crudele v. Cook, 165 So.2d 424 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963). DADE COUNTY, FLA., METROPOLITAN CODE § 33-316 (1959) provides "No person aggrieved by any . . . order . . . of an
administrative official . . . may apply to the court for relief unless he has first exhausted the
remedies provided. .. ."

61. 166 So.2d 191 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
62. Id. at 194.
63. Sun Ray Homes, Inc. v. Dade County, 166 So.2d 827 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964); Dade
County v. Carmichael, 165 So.2d 227 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964); Dade County v. Markoe, 164
So.2d 881 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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the legality of a decision of a municipal board of adjustment.64 This review is in the nature of a trial de novo.65 Evidence is offered and the
court is authorized to make an independent determination of the quasijudicial, administrative decision. This statute does not, however, apply
to the quasi-judicial determinations of a board of county commissioners.66
In Dade County v. Carmichael,7 the aggrieved landowner petitioned the
circuit court to issue a writ of certiorari to review the action of the
county zoning authorities. A transcript of the proceeding of the Zoning
Appeals Board and the resolution of the Board of County Commissioners
was attached to the petition. The chancellor permitted the landowner to
enter additional evidence over the objection of the county. When the
circuit court ordered rezoning, the county appealed. The third district
reversed with directions to the circuit court to base its decision on the
records of the boards and to take no new evidence into consideration."
The courts are not allowed to look into the motives of a legislative
body, nor are the courts allowed to review acts of a legislative body by
traditional certiorari. Only those decisions of an administrative board
which have a judicial or quasi-judicial character are subject to review in
such proceedings. 9 In Dade County v. Markoe,7 ° the Board of County
Commissioners ignored the recommendations of both its Zoning Appeals
Board and its Building and Zoning Department, and issued a resolution
allowing the landowner to use his property for business. On rehearing,
initiated at the request of neighboring property owners, the Board adopted
another resolution rescinding its earlier action. The landowner then filed
a petition in the circuit court for a writ of certiorari' to challenge the
64. FLA.

STAT. § 176.16 (1965).
Any person or persons, jointly or severally, aggrieved by any decision of the
board of adjustment, or any taxpayer, or any officer, department, board or bureau
of the governing body of said municipality, may present to a circuit court a petition
for issuance of a writ of certiorari, duly verified, setting forth that such decision is
illegal, in whole or in part, specifying the grounds of the illegality in the manner
and within the time provided by the Florida appellate rules.
65. A proceeding in the circuit court in the nature of a trial de novo is reviewable in
the district court of appeal. Josephson v. Autrey, 96 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1957). See generally, 2
BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONs § 38.14 (1964).
66. Harris v. Goff, supra note 47.
67. 165 So.2d 227 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
68. FLA. APP. R. 4.1 provides that all appellate review of the rulings of these boards
shall be by certiorari as set out in the rules. FLA. APp. R. 4.5(c) describes the procedures
necessary in certiorari proceedings. FLA. APP. R. 4.5(a)(2) states that an application for a
writ of certiorari will not be entertained by the court if questions of fact are raised which
will require the taking of testimony. Accord, Bloomfield v. Mayo, 119 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1960) ; DeGroot v. Sheffield, 95 So.2d 912 (Fla. 1957).
69. Schauer v. City of Miami Beach, 112 So.2d 838 (Fla. 1959), affirming City of Miami
Beach v. Schauer, 104 So.2d 129 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958), held that the court could not review
the motivation of the council's action in adopting an amendment to a general zoning ordinance. That action was a "legislative" rather than a "quasi-judicial" function.
70. 164 So.2d 881 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).

71.

DADE COUNTY,

FLA.,

METROPOLITAN CODE

§ 33-316 (1959).

No person aggrieved by any zoning resolution, order, requirement, decision
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validity of the rescission. The circuit court quashed the resolution calling
for a rescission. However, on appeal the decision was favorable to the
county. The circuit court did not have jurisdiction to nullify the legislative action of the Board of County Commissioners by traditional
72
certiorari.

Sun Ray Homes, Inc. v. Dade County73 held that an action by the
Board of County Commissioners, in reviewing an interpretation and application of an ordinance by the Zoning Appeals Board, is a quasi-judicial
function; therefore, traditional certiorari was the proper method of review.
To summarize, in seeking judicial review from the determination of
a zoning authority, the correct procedure will depend upon the following
factors: (1) if the administrative body is a municipal authority or a
county authority; (2) whether the attack is on the validity of the ordinance as a whole or whether the attack is upon a quasi-judicial determination of the zoning authority. Depending upon the answer to the first
question, review will be by either statutory certiorari, in the form of a
trial de novo, or by traditional certiorari, in which only the record below
will be reviewed to see if the evidence supported the decision. The
or determination of an administrative official or by any decision of the zoning appeals board may apply to the court for relief unless he has first exhausted the
remedies provided for herein and taken all available steps provided in this article.
It is the intention of the board of county commissioners that all steps as provided
by this article shall be taken before any application is made to the court for relief;
and no application shall be made to the court for relief except from resolution
adopted by the board of county commissioners, pursuant to this article. In view of
the lack of a legislatively prescribed method to apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to review a decision of the board of county commissioners, when adopted
pursuant to this article, it is intended and suggested that such decisions may be
reviewed by the filing of a petition for writ of certiorariin the circuit court of the
eleventh judicial circuit in and for Dade County, Fla., in accordance with the procedure and within the time provided by the Florida Appellate Rules for the review
of the rulings of any commission or board. (Emphasis added.)
72. In Harris v. Goff, 151 So.2d 642, 644 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963), on interlocutory appeal,
it was asked
What is the proper method of obtaining judicial review of a county zoning resolution where the statute impowering the county to legislate in this field does not
provide the procedure to be followed in seeking the relief permitted?
In Go§, the Board of County Commissioners contended that the proper procedure was
certiorari, not by a direct proceeding in equity for an injunction as was sought by the
plaintiff. The board contended that the FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES, discussed note 68 supra,
were exclusive.
The first district held that the board's contention was valid-if the board's proceedings
were judicial or quasi-judicial in character. To be judicial or quasi-judicial, the statute
under which the board or agency acts must require notice and hearing and the judgment
of the board must be founded on the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing.
See generally Pickar, Survey of Administrative Law, 12 U. MIAMI L. REv. 261, 273
(1958), where the case of DeGroot v. Sheffield, 95 So.2d 912 (Fla. 1957) is discussed. That
case indicates the correct route to judicial review of administrative action when the appropriate statute fails to provide for such review or fails to indicate the method. See also
Comment, 2 MiAmi L.Q. 181 (1947).
73. 166 So.2d 827 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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answer to the second question will determine whether an original suit in
equity will be proper rather than either statutory or traditional certiorari.
III.

ZONING FOR AESTHETICS

Traditionally, the police power could not be used to accomplish primarily aesthetic objectives.74 While aesthetic bases for zoning regulations
are presently considered desirable, such considerations do not, by themselves, give vitality to such ordinances under substantive due process. 75
If, as in areas of Florida where the attractiveness of a community has a
substantial influence upon its economy, aesthetic zoning can be effectively
related to the general welfare, the regulations will be upheld.7 6
An ordinance which places an entire municipality into a residential
district is not per se arbitrary and unreasonable. Assuming a relationship
to health, safety, morals or the general welfare, it will be upheld.77 In
Blank v. Town of Lake Clarke Shores,78 the court stated that the result
of an order to rezone one piece of property might necessitate the rezoning
of all property, thereby destroying the entire residential zoning plan by
"judicial erosion."
IV.

EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL

Failure to enforce a valid police regulation in one case or in many
cases does not affect the power to enforce it in other cases.7 9 In City of
Miami v. Walker s° the owner of commercial property sought to erect a
gasoline station. He challenged the constitutionality of an ordinance that
required a seven hundred and fifty foot distance between filling stations,
putting weight on the fact that the city had granted seventy-five variances
74. Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 218 (1955).
75. Watson v. Mayflower Property, Inc., 177 So.2d 355 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
76. Merritt v. Peters, 65 So.2d 861 (Fla. 1953); City of Miami Beach v. Ocean &
Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So.2d 364 (1941); City of Sarasota v. Sunad, Inc., 114 So.2d
377 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959), rev'd, Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1960).
[Alesthetic considerations have . . . been recognized and . . . [are] particularly
relevant to the community of Miami Beach because of its general character ....
It is difficult to see how the success of Miami Beach could continue if its aesthetic
appeal were ignored because the beauty of the community is a distinct lure to the
winter traveler. City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., supra at 367.
Justice Barnes' dissent in Merrit v. Peters, supra at 862, contended that City of Miami
Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co. is not authority for holding "aesthetic grounds alone" are
sufficient grounds for the application of police power.
National attention has recently been focused on aesthetics because of the "beautification
program" spurred on by Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson, our First Lady. Wall Street Journal, Jan.
27, 1966, p. 1, col. 1.
77. Gautier v. Town of Jupiter Island, 142 So.2d 321 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
78. 161 So.2d 683 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
79. 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 38.10(4) (1964).
80. 169 So.2d 842 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
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from that regulation. The chancellor held that the ordinance, as applied
to the particular property, was discriminatory and unconstitutional. The
third district reversed. Whether the city had permitted several hundred
or a few filling stations to be within the prohibited distance is conclusive
of nothing. The city had not waived, nor was it equitably estopped from
enforcing, the terms of the ordinance.
Likewise, just because an owner of land relied upon the existing
"business" zoning classification when he purchased the land, he cannot
claim that the zoning body is equitably estopped from subsequently rezoning the land as residential. Edelstein v. Dade County8' held that a
property owner does not have a vested right in a particular zoning in the
absence of an
expenditure of money on the land in compliance with exist82
zoning.
ing
A clear case of equitable estoppel was presented in City of Gainsville v. Bishop.83 An ordinance was amended so that gasoline stations
were a permitted use. Relying upon the amendment, the present owner
bought real estate, obtained a permit, and incurred substantial expense
arranging for construction and mortgage commitments. The change of
zoning became a political issue in a campaign. After the election, the
ordinance was again amended so that gasoline stations would be barred.
The ordinance, in essence, had become a political football. The decision
by the chancellor, estopping the city, was affirmed on appeal. The undisputed evidence established that the aggrieved property owner, in
good faith reliance upon the city's action in rezoning the subject property
to permit its use for a gasoline station, changed his position materially
and incurred substantial expense. The city was now equitably estopped
from revoking the issued building permit and could not change the ordinance again.84
V.

CHANGE IN CONDITIONS

A change in conditions may cause a once valid ordinance to become
invalid. Even though the same landowner may have previously attacked
the zoning ordinance and lost, a change in conditions would allow him
to enter another contest with the zoning authorities."5
The factual situation presented in City of Miami Beach v. First
81. 171 So.2d 611 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
82. Accord, City of Miami Beach v. 8701 Collins Ave., 77 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1954);
Sarasota County v. Walker, 144 So.2d 345 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
83. 174 So.2d 100 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1965).
84. Accord, Sakolsky v. City of Coral Gables, 151 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1963); Bregar v.
Britton, 75 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1954); Texas Co. v. Town of Miami Springs, 44 So.2d 808
(Fla. 1950).
85. 2 BOYR, FLORMA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 38.10(5) (1964).
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Trust Co.,86 popularly known as the Firestone Case, 7 came alive once
more in Watson v. Mayflower Property, Inc.88 The property owner sought
to cancel a single family dwelling zoning ordinance as it applied to his
one thousand foot long, four hundred and fifty foot wide tract bounded
on the east by the ocean and the west by a lake. The land immediately
to the south and north was zoned to permit motels and hotels, with some
land already occupied by such buildings. Qualified witnesses testified
that, in their opinion, the highest and best use of the land 9 was for hotels
and apartments. Since the present zoning ordinance became effective,
many physical, economic and social changes had occurred in the area.
The assessed value of the property had tripled in three years. The land
would be valued at four times its present evaluation were it classified
less restrictively. The circuit court decreed the ordinance void as applied
to the tract and the second district affirmed.9 ' When the reason for
zoning restrictions is no longer present, such restrictions should be
removed.
VI.

RETROACTIVE ZONING, NONCONFORMING USES, VARIANCES

A zoning ordinance is invalid and unreasonable when it attempts to
exclude existing uses that are not nuisances. In some states, zoning regulations cannot be made retroactive. Courts may allow nonconforming
uses (those that are in existence at the time the zoning regulation classi-

fies the property for more restrictive purposes) to continue because of
the obvious injustice to an individual if a new zoning regulation would

result in immediate termination of an existing property use.92 However,
it is generally held that zoning ordinances can eliminate nonconforming
uses by: (1) incorporating a "grandfather clause" in the ordinance
86. City of Miami Beach v. First Trust Co., 45 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1949), rehearing, 45
So.2d 687 (Fla. 1950).
87. In Firestone, the land in question was ocean front property, bounded on the west
by Indian River. Land to the south was zoned for hotels and apartment houses, while land
a little farther north of the Firestone Estate was also zoned for hotels. Other facts that
made the Mayflower case on "all fours" were as follows: the local population has recently
increased vastly; if rezoned, the value of the property would quadruple; the taxes on the
property had risen out of proportion to its present zoned use; the income produced by
renting the property as restricted was minimal; the general area of the property had become heavily congested because of mushrooming changes; and the "aesthetic" argument of
the city and the landowners from across Indian River had no weight. See Wright, Zoning
Under the Florida Law, 7 MIAmi L.Q. 324, 334-344 (1953).
88. 177 So.2d 355 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965). This case is also discussed in text accompanying
note 29 supra.
89. The purpose of zoning laws is to put the land to the uses to which it is best adapted.
Forde v. City of Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 1 So.2d 642 (1941).
90. "The excellent final decree by the Chancellor." Circuit Court Judge Lamar Warran
of Broward County, was quoted in length by the Second District. Watson v. Mayflower
Property, Inc., 177 So.2d 355, 362 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
91. 8 McQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.181 (3d ed. rev. 1957).

92. Fortunato v. City of Coral Gables, 47 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1950).
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(setting a date under which the property owners can gradually eliminate
the non conforming use); (2) not allowing a nonconforming use to be reestablished after it has discontinued; and (3) not allowing repairs or
structural changes on the property. 8 The courts, recognizing the purpose
of zoning laws, view the legislative intent with liberality so as to restrict,
not expand, nonconforming uses.94
Recently, Dade County successfully eliminated an existing nonconforming use by converting it into a conditional nonconforming use
and then cancelling the use for breach of the condition. In Smalleylogics
Corp. v. Dade County,9 5 an application for a special variance permit to
enlarge a thirty acre nonconforming use, by allowing such use on an additional nine acres, was approved as the owner guaranteed that certain
conditions would be adhered to. The variance permit was subject to
cancellation for violation of the conditions.
After violation of a condition, the owner was required to show cause
why the resolution should not be cancelled. After notice, public hearing,
and administrative appeal, the Board of County Commissioners directed
that all permits authorizing nonconforming use on any and all portions
of the property, including the total thirty-nine acres, be "phased out"
within the following ten months.
The owner then filed a complaint in the circuit court praying for a
decree adjudicating that the resolutions unreasonably and unlawfully
attempted to nullify a previous nonconforming zoning use. Upon a dismissal of the complaint with prejudice,9 6 the owner appealed to the
third district, where it was held that the conditions of the variance permit
were not confined to the nine acres, but applied to the entire property.
The original existing nonconforming use was converted into a conditional
nonconforming use or variance. Use of the property in violation of the
conditions, imposed in granting the special variance permit, justified forfeiture of the right to the conditional nonconforming use as to the entire
property.
A city cannot refuse to issue a permit to a property owner which
would enable him to make the most liberal use of his land within the re93. 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 38.12 (1964); Norton, Elimination

of Incompatible Uses & Structures, 20 LAW & CONTER P. PROB. 305 (1955); Note, 6
MIAmi L.Q. 135 (1951). Of course, if a nonconforming use constitutes a nuisance in fact, it
may be eliminated under that theory.
94. Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 87 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Fla. 1949), aff'd, 183
F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950), stated that Florida municipalities have established their power to eliminate nonconforming uses.
95. 176 So.2d 574 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
96. Apparently, the trial judge's order was based upon the conclusion that the plaintiff
had misconceived its remedy. The Third District affirmed on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. "[Blecause of the often expressed principle that the
order of a trial judge will be sustained on appellate review if it is correct, even though upon
a ground other than that given by the trial judge." Id. at 576.
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strictions of the particular zoning area. This is true even if all the
surrounding properties are single residences and a landowner wants to
build a gasoline station, a permitted use. In City of Hollywood v. Pettersen,0 ' the circuit court issued a writ of mandamus"8 to the city either
to issue the permit or show cause why it should not. The contention of
the city was that it had shown a prior intention to rezone the land as
residential and had, in fact, advertised for a public hearing after the
issuance of the writ. This, the city argued, constituted "zoning in progress." However, the second district said this would be, in reality, the
adoption of retroactive zoning regulations by which the city was trying
to justify its failure to complete the process of amending its zoning
ordinance.
Proof that literal enforcement of provisions of a zoning regulation
would result in unnecessary hardship is a prerequisite to the award of a
variance. 9 The hardship must be unique to the individual landowner,
not shared by others in the area.'0 0 If the only hardship shown is economic
advantage to another, it is not sufficient to warrant a variance as long as
the property could be used for its zoned use.' 0 '
Also, when a person applies for a variance he is, in effect, admitting
the validity of the zoning ordinance, and he may not thereafter contest
the constitutionality of the regulation, even as applied to his property.0 2
VII.

REGULATION OF A GOVERNMENTAL PROPRIETARY FUNCTION BY
ZONING

A governmental body, if operating in a proprietary capacity, is subject to the zoning regulations of the area in which it operates, absent
specific legislation to the contrary. 3
The question of whether one city may impose its zoning regulations

on another arose in City of Treasure Island v. Decker.' 4 In 1937, under
statutory authority, the city of Treasure Island constructed a causeway
between itself and St. Petersburg, with the eastern half of the causeway
97. 178 So.2d 919 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
98. Although the city charter had a provision therein that no suit may be instituted
against the city unless a written statement giving the particulars of the alleged cause of
action be filed with the city attorney at least thirty days before such suit is instituted, that
provision does not apply to the common law writ of mandamus. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 20
states that "The Legislature shall not pass special or local laws . . . regulating the practice
of courts of justice .... "
99. FLA. STAT. § 176.14(3) (1965); DADE: COUNTY, FLA., METROPOLITAN CODE § 33311(e) (1959).
100. 35 FLA. Jusr. Zoning Laws § 24 (1961).

101. Dade County v. Frank N' Bun Operating Co., 169 So.2d 875 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
102. Servatt v. Dade County, 173 So.2d 175 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
103. Nichols Engineering &' Research Corp. v. State ex rel. Knight, 59 So.2d 874 (Fla.
1952) ; State ex rel. Helseth v. Du Bose, 99 Fla. 812, 128 So. 4 (1930).
104. 174 So.2d 756 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
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located in St. Petersburg. The toll gate had been located in the middle
of the causeway, but a permit was sought by the city of Treasure Island
to have the toll gate moved to the St. Petersburg end of the causeway.
Since the land under the causeway on the St. Petersburg side was zoned
residential, a toll gate would not have been permitted there, but municipal uses would be allowed.
It was held that a toll gate was not a "municipal use" but was a
proprietary function," 5 subject to local residence zoning.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

In zoning, the function of the court and the function of the legislative body is, in theory, clearly defined. The court's duty is to determine
whether the governmental body was within the limits of its power and
if the public gain under due process outweighs the individual's loss.
The legislature's duty is to promulgate the law, taking into account the
benefits and burdens to the public. Although the words "gain" and "loss"
convey a sense of exactness when used in the accounting or tax fields,
such is far from the case in the law of zoning. The Florida Legislature
has granted a wide discretion to local zoning officials. The courts should,
in turn, recognize this grant of power by clothing the local governmental
bodies with a presumption of validity." 6 Although the identity of the
beneficial recipient of the presumption remains unsettled in Florida, the
onus of proof probably remains on the landowner to prove an ordinance
to be invalid under substantive due process. The presumption of validity,
which should be a substantial presumption attached to the findings of a
zoning board, is defensible once one recognizes that judges do not, and
probably should not consider themselves experts in the field of zoning.
Certainly as long as the Florida property owner is protected by his
constitutional safeguards of substantive and procedural due process, his
rights to administrative and judicial review by a judiciary, which will
review facts and overrule the legislative body when it acts capriciously,
our property owners need not fear losses from unreasonable or irrational
whims of zoning officials.
105. Day v. City of St. Augustine, 104 Fla. 261, 139 So. 880 (1932).
106. See discussion of "presumptions" in text accompanying notes 13 to 34, supra.

